Steve Wiegand: California water war follows a decades-old flow

In today's historical epistle, we provide some admittedly simplistic background for the current tussle over addressing California's water woes:

Edmund G. "Pat" Brown probably wasn't the most eloquent chief executive California has ever had. He's the guy who, after touring a North Coast flood in 1964, exclaimed, "This is the worst disaster since I was elected governor."

Still, Brown succinctly defined the state's water dilemma just after taking over as governor in 1959.

"We do not have enough water when and where we need it," he told legislators in unveiling what would become known as the State Water Project. "We have too much water when and where we don't need it."

Of course Brown wasn't the first Californian to notice this problem, nor the first to try to resolve it.

In the early part of the 20th century, Los Angeles officials put together a plan to build an aqueduct that would carry water from the Owens River Valley on the eastern side of the Sierra to the growing, and thirsty, metropolis. San Francisco officials did much the same thing in the north, building a dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley to store water from the Tuolumne River.

In the late 1920s, a combination of private, state and federal interests pushed through construction of a dam at Boulder Canyon in Nevada to store water from the Colorado River, much of it to be used by California farmers in the Imperial Valley.

And in the 1930s, legislators and voters narrowly approved the Central Valley Project, a $170 million plan to re-engineer water distribution through the heart of the state.

But the "second Gold Rush" swelled California's population after World War II and necessitated another major undertaking.

As envisioned by Brown, a dam would be built on the Feather River near Oroville in Butte County, linked to hundreds of miles of a "man-made river" that would carry the stored water south and have spurs and storage facilities along the way. Brown put a hefty price tag on it: $500 million.

Like virtually every other water project ever proposed in California, the State Water Project fairly dripped with dissent.

Northerners feared their water would be drained off; Southerners feared Northerners would control the tap. Organized labor didn't like it because it would help agribusiness but not the farmworkers they wanted to unionize; the state Grange didn't like it because they figured big farmers would hog the water.

Worse, the costs of the plan spiraled to $1.75 billion, equivalent to 75 percent of the state's budget.

To avoid having his plan pecked to death, Brown decided to push through its basic elements in a single bill, then let the details be worked out separately. The idea was that once the main part was passed, the warring interests would have little choice but to try to work out their differences.

In 1959, legislators approved the main bill. Authored by Sen. Hugh Burns, a Fresno Democrat, and Assemblyman Carley Porter, a Compton Democrat, the Burns-Porter Act authorized the bonds for the project, subject to voter approval.

Brown got voter approval for his plan in November 1960 – but just barely. Throughout the night of Nov. 8, the vote teetered at 50-50. It was so close that the Nov. 9 edition of The Bee carried a headline reading "Water Bond Issue Trails," accompanied by a story saying it was ahead.

Finally, a 90 percent voter turnout in Los Angeles County helped push it over by 174,000 votes, out of 5.8 million cast. Only one Northern California county, Butte, had voted for it.

In his journal the next day, Brown wrote just two words, which may serve as comfort – or a warning – to the current combatants in the debate over more dams and new bonds:

"Water wins."

About the writer:

• Call The Bee's Steve Wiegand, (916) 321-1076. Back columns, www.sacbee.com/wiegand.